Adversarial Contract Design for Private Data Commercialization by Naghizadeh, Parinaz & Sinha, Arunesh
Adversarial Contract Design for Private Data Commercialization
Parinaz Naghizadeh1∗ and Arunesh Sinha2∗
1 Electrical and Computer Engineering, Purdue University
2 Computer Science and Engineering, University of Michigan
parinaz@purdue.edu, arunesh@umich.edu
Abstract
The proliferation of data collection and machine learning techniques has created an opportunity for commercialization of private data by
data aggregators. In this paper, we study this data monetization problem using a contract-theoretic approach. Our proposed adversarial
contract design framework accounts for the heterogeneity in honest buyers’ demands for data, as well as the presence of adversarial
buyers who may purchase data to compromise its privacy. We propose the notion of Price of Adversary (PoAdv) to quantify the effects
of adversarial users on the data seller’s revenue, and provide bounds on the PoAdv for various classes of adversary utility. We also
provide a fast approximate technique to compute contracts in the presence of adversaries.
1 Introduction
The large-scale adoption of data-driven decision making by businesses has led to a boom in big data collection and analysis
techniques. With increasing amount and demand for data, companies have found a business opportunity in offering data-based
services to other companies, or selling their data to interested parties (Thomas and Leiponen 2016; Spiekermann et al. 2015).
Interest in data monetization is evidenced by the rise of data marketplaces, where firms and individuals can buy, sell, or trade,
second or third party data. Examples include Salesforce’s Data Studio, Oracle’s BlueKai, and Adobe’s Audience Marketplace.
Data commercialization faces many challenges, including IP protection, liability, pricing, and preserving privacy (Thomas and
Leiponen 2016). In this paper, we focus on the latter two challenges of pricing and privacy.
The challenge of pricing refers to the fact that to accommodate diverse demands, data sellers offer different plans and
pricing to their customers. Even with identical data, customers may derive different benefits from utilizing it, e.g., due to
different expertise, or how this data complements the customer’s existing knowledge. Therefore, to maximize revenue, the data
seller should account for this demand diversity by packaging its data accordingly. Further, despite its revenue benefits, data
commercialization has to overcome the challenge of limiting privacy risks for the data subjects in the database. Specifically,
adversarial buyers can request access to the database, attempting to compromise the privacy of the data subjects. Therefore,
data sellers should account for this risk when designing and pricing data plans.
In this paper, we take a contract theoretical (Mas-Colell et al. 1995) approach to address both the aforementioned pricing and
privacy challenges of data commercialization by proposing the design of a set of contracts with varying privacy levels. Contract
theory, in the classic context of pricing of goods, is the study of principal-agent problems, in which the principal (here, the data
seller) designs a set of contracts with varying consumption level so as to extract maximum revenue from agents (buyers) with
unknown types. We study the problem of pricing a bundle of database queries at different privacy levels with the aim of (a)
maximizing revenue by offering different prices for varying privacy levels in order to accommodate the diversity of demands
for the query bundle, and (b) accounting for the risks from adversarial users by modifying the contracts’ pricing accordingly.
We use the well accepted -differential privacy concept as the measure of privacy (Dwork 2008). We make an effort to keep our
design practical by attempting to adhere to practices already in place in data marketplaces (see Sections 2 and 3).
Technical contributions: (1) Existing contract theory results suggest that given n + 1 types of agents (n types of honest
buyers based on their diversity of demand, and an adversarial type), the principal should design up to n+ 1 contracts. We show
that the data owner will offer at most n contracts. In other words, it is optimal for the data owner to avoid the impractical option
of designing a contract for the adversary; (2) we incorporate post-hoc fines (in case of privacy breach) in the pricing of query
bundles, and analyze their effect on the contract design problem, showing that fines can be helpful in reducing loss due to the
adversarial users in many situations; (3) we propose the notion of Price of Adversary (PoAdv) to quantify the loss incurred by
the data owner due to the presence of adversarial data buyers. We show that while PoAdv can be unbounded in the worst case,
it is possible to bound the PoAdv for a large class of problems; and (4) we provide a fast approximate technique to compute
the contracts in presence of adversaries. All omitted and full version of proofs are in the appendix.
∗Parinaz and Arunesh equally contributed to this work.
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2 Background
Database marketing examples: Currently, the two industries leading database marketing are data brokers (who mine and
sell consumer data to businesses), and data marketplaces (which provide a platform for buying, selling, and trading data). We
elaborate upon typical privacy guarantees offered by each with an example. Among data brokers, Acxiom, one of the largest
brokers worldwide, states that they maintain “privacy compliant data” through data encryption and secure data management
techniques (Acxiom. 2018). The user service agreement of Salesforce Data Studio (salesforce.com, inc. 2018) on the other
hand, provides more detailed information about their market structure. For instance, Salesforce states that they use “unique
user identifiers (user IDs) to help ensure that activities can be attributed to the responsible individual”, and that security logs
are kept “in order to enable security reviews and analysis.” Our model in Section 3 takes the availability of these monitoring
techniques into account. It is clear that following such safe practices is imperative when dealing with private information, e.g.,
as evidenced by the recent Cambridge Analytica case (Granville 2018).
Differential privacy: A popular formalism of privacy loss due to adversarial queries from statistical databases is that of
differential privacy (DP) (Dwork et al. 2006; Dwork 2008). Formally, let K be a randomized algorithm used by a data owner to
release answers to queries from a database, and consider two databases D1 and D2 that differ in exactly one entry (row). Then,
K is -differentially private (-DP) for  ≥ 0 if for any output O of the algorithm,
Pr(K(D1) ∈ O) ≤ exp() · Pr(K(D2) ∈ O) . (1)
In words, -DP requires that the output of K remains sufficiently unaffected (as quantified by ), whether or not a single data
subject’s data is included in the database. The choice of  determines the privacy loss due to K, with lower  corresponding to
better privacy. Note that this privacy guarantee is independent of any auxiliary information available to an adversary (Dwork
2008).
For continuous-valued queries, a method for achieving differential privacy is the introduction of carefully selected random
noise in the responses. Specifically, let f be a query function, returning the true value f(D) on databaseD. In order to guarantee
-DP, an algorithmK can introduce additive Laplacian noise, returning instead f(D)+Lap(∆f/), where ∆f is the sensitivity
of the query function (Dwork et al. 2006). While this approach limits the privacy loss to within , it also decreases the utility of
the queries to honest buyers by adding noise that increases in 1 . In Section 3, we formalize buyers’ sensitivity to their queries’
accuracy, and consequently, their willingness to pay for more accurate answers. The seller’s contract design should balance this
tradeoff with the increased privacy loss from adding less noise.
3 Model
We study the problem of designing a set of contracts for buyers requesting access to a database managed by a seller. We assume
that the seller has already acquired data from subjects and compensated them using a one-time monetary payment or a free
service (like a phone app). We use he/his for buyers and she/her for the seller.
Queries: There are multiple (and finite) types of potential statistical queries that can be made from the database, denoted by
the set Q. The seller offers bundles consisting of a subset of these query types for purchase, with the restriction that any buyer
can choose at most one bundle. A bundle is identified by the set {Q1, . . . , Qk | Qi ∈ Q}. The seller designs these bundles
based on historical or external information about the types of different buyers, so that every buyers’ requirement is met by one
of the bundles. Further, for any bundle, the seller limits the number of queries of each type Qi in the bundle to one (i.e., each
bundle is a subset of distinct query types). This follows recommended practices in differential privacy, since allowing multiple
queries inevitably degrade privacy guarantees (see also Section 7). We also posit that the seller verifies the identity of buyers,
in order to keep track of the buyer’s query purchases, and to investigate a privacy attack if it occurs. Further, we posit that the
seller, via her service agreement, restricts buyers from faking identifies by imposing substantial post-hoc fines.
Contracts: For each bundle {Q1, . . . , Qk}, the set of possible contracts are determined by the parameters (p, , s), with
p ∈ R≥0 denoting the price to be paid by the buyer. The privacy levels are assumed to be bounded and normalized such that
 ∈ [0, 1], with  specifying the bound  ≥ 1 + . . .+ k, where i is used to determine the (Laplace) noise added to the answer
of the query of type Qi; the buyer is free to request any 1, . . . , k within the  bound, with higher  corresponding to less noisy
responses. Lastly, s denotes the post-hoc fine to be paid if the buyer is found misusing the query answer.
Buyers: We assume that buyers belong to one of two possible classes: honest or adversarial.
Honest buyers: Honest buyers do not misuse query answers, and hence generate revenue for the operator when purchasing
contracts. Each honest buyer for a given bundle has a type i ∈ Θ := {1, . . . , n}, determining his benefit from the database.
In particular, an honest buyer of type i purchasing contract (p, , s) derives a benefit bi() : [0, 1] → R≥0 from accessing
the system. This function includes direct gain from the data, as well as the cost of hedging against the risk of potential direct
attack on the buyer. We impose natural conditions on the benefit functions (as is standard for demand functions) bi(·): that the
overall benefit increases with larger  (monotone non-decreasing) and satisfies diminishing returns (concavity), with bi(0) = 0.
Most large organizations estimate demand functions and types of buyers from past buyers’ activity, and insurance premiums
are known; hence, we assume these functions are known. Further, bi() ≤ bi+1(),∀, ∀i; that is, higher types derive further
benefit from the same noise level, e.g., due to their expertise or the relevance of the data to their tasks.
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An honest buyer also has a γ probability of suffering an attack himself and causing inadvertent misuse of the query answer,
which results in an expected γs loss for him as per the contract terms. Thus, an honest buyer’s overall expected utility in its
interaction with the seller is given by ui(p, , s) = bi()− p− γs.
Adversarial buyers: An adversarial buyer seeks to access the database with the goal of compromising its privacy. Formally,
an adversarial buyer purchasing a bundle through a contract (p, , s) derives a benefit C() : [0, 1] → R≥0 from an attack on
the system, with overall adversary utility given by uA(p, , s) = C()− p− s. This attack results in a cost C() for the seller.
Further, we assume C(·) is monotone increasing and convex, with C(0) = 0; intuitively, higher  (lower noise) lead to costlier
attacks for the seller, with the severity increasing as the noise decreases. Such convexity has also been noted in literature, e.g.,
a recent work (Hsu et al. 2014) proposes the cost for seller to be proportional to exp() − 1. Figure 1 shows an example of C
and bi.
We assume that a privacy attack is ultimately discovered, and the seller can track the buyer responsible for the attack. The
seller may have to compensate data subjects after a privacy attack (due to lawsuits), which can be partially recovered from the
post-hoc fine for data misuse. Note that we have assumed that the adversary cannot cause privacy loss beyond the given  of
the bundle by combining the outputs of multiple queries of the same type, as the seller restricts the number of queries per type
to one. Further, large post-hoc fines for faking identities prevent the rational adversary from faking identities and attempting to
purchase two or more bundles. However, the post-hoc fine for data misuse cannot be set too large as this fine affects the honest
buyers, and hence the seller’s revenue, due to potential attacks on honest buyers. Therefore, our goal is to study the optimal
choice of fines for data misuse so as to deter adversarial buyers while maintaining the demand from honest buyers.
3.1 Seller’s revenue optimization problem
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bi() = i(1 − exp(− 10i ))
for i = 1, 2, 3, adversary
cost C() = 6(exp() −
1), and non-adversarial price-
contract curve.
We now analyze the seller’s contract design problem, with one contract (p, , s) for each
offered bundle. As all rational buyers choose only one bundle due to the marketplace
design, these contracts are independent. Therefore, for the rest of this paper, we restrict
attention to a given bundle.
Let ρ denote the fraction of adversarial buyers, which is estimated by the seller (con-
servatively, the seller can estimate ρ to be at most a maximum value). For the honest
buyers, let {qi}i∈Θ denote the fraction of the honest buyers of type i. These fractions can
be estimated from historical data. The seller aims to maximize her revenue. Nevertheless,
she can not observe individual buyers’ types when selling a contract. Consequently, she
has to design contracts while balancing two goals: deriving the maximum possible profit
from honest types, while limiting the adversarial type’s cost to the system.
In classic contract theory, following the revelation principle (Mas-Colell et al. 1995,
Proposition 14.C.2), it is known that it is enough to offer at most n+1 contracts when the
number of buyer types is n+1. 1 Each agent then selects his intended contract if it satisfies
the agent’s individual rationality (IR) and incentive compatibility (IC) constraints. The
IR constraint requires that the agent attains higher utility from purchasing the contract
compared to opting out. The IC constraint imposes the condition that an agent of type i
prefers his intended contract over that of any type j 6= i.
Formally, for our contract design problem, consider the n+ 1 user types consisting of
the n honest buyers and the adversarial type. Let the contract of type i ∈ Θ be (pi, i, si)
and that for the adversary be (pA, A, sA). Assume, wlog, that the utility of opting out of purchasing contracts is zero. Then, the
IR constraint of an honest buyer of type i, denoted by IRi, is given by ui(pi, i, si) ≥ 0. Similarly, IRA is uA(pA, A, sA) ≥ 0.
Type i’s IC constraints are given by ui(pi, i, si) ≥ ui(pj , j , sj),∀j 6= i where the jth constraint is denoted by ICi,j and
ui(pi, i, si) ≥ ui(pA, A, sA) which is denoted as ICi,A. Similarly, the ICA,i constraints can be defined for the adversary.
The seller’s goal is to maximize her revenue R
(
(pi, i, si)i∈Θ, pA, A, sA
)
= (1− ρ)(∑ni=1 qi(pi + γsi))+ ρ(pA + sA −
C(lA)). However, the seller only has steady revenue over time from pi; γsi provides randomly varying revenue over time. Thus,
we impose the practical constraint that pi ≥ (1− φ)(pi + γsi), which says that a large fraction 1− φ of revenue arrive steadily
over time. We name this the steady revenue SRi constraint. Therefore, the seller’s contract design problem can be formally
stated as the following optimization:
max
(pi,i,si)i∈Θ,pA,A,sA
R
(
(pi, i, si)i∈Θ, pA, A, sA
)
subject to IRi, SRi ∀i and ICi,j ∀i, j and
IRA and ICi,A, ICA,i ∀i and
pi, i, si ≥ 0 ∀i and pA, A, sA ≥ 0
1Depending on the distribution of buyers’ types, it may be optimal to offer the same contract to adjacent types (pooling contracts), instead
of separate contracts for each type (separating contracts).
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3.2 No need for an adversary-specific contract
The contract design problem above includes a contract (pA, A, sA) for the adversary. While the formulation is mathematically
sound and consistent with the revelation principle, this seems an odd design choice as the adversary reveals his type just by
choosing this contract. We show that, as intuitively expected, it is in fact not required for the seller to design an adversary-
specific contract.
Lemma 1. The seller should offer at most n contracts/bundles. In particular, it is never optimal to offer an adversary-specific
contract/bundle.
Proof. We show this by contradiction. Assume the seller treats the adversarial buyer as the (n+1)-th type, and offers a contract
(pA, A, sA) satisfying all (honest and adversarial) buyers’ IR and IC constraints. By IRA, this contract satisfies C(A) −
pA − sA ≥ 0; that is, it will impose a loss pA + sA − C(lA) ≤ 0 on the seller’s revenue. Further, by the ICA,i constraints,
C(A)−pA−sA ≥ C(i)−pi−si; that is, had the adversary purchased any of the legitimate buyers’ contracts, he would have
imposed a smaller cost on the seller’s revenue. As the seller is a profit-maximizer, we conclude that such contract (pA, A, sA)
should not be part of an optimal collection of contracts.
Given the above lemma, the contract design problem in the adversarial setting is to design contracts (pi, i, si)i∈Θ in order
to maximize the revenue of the operator:
(1− ρ)( n∑
i=1
qi(pi + γsi)
)
+ ρ(pZ + sZ − C(Z)) ,
where Z ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n} is the contract chosen by the adversary, subject to IR and IC constraints for all honest buyers in
choosing their contract i and the adversary in choosing Z. For the special case of the adversary not choosing any contract, we
designate Z = 0 with p0 = s0 = 0 = 0. Observe that Z is a variable, and thus, the revenue maximizing problem is a bi-level
optimization problem. However, following the standard technique of introducing an additional variable to formulate a zero-sum
problem as a linear program, we formulate the revenue maximization problem in the adversarial setting using variable rA as
follows:
max
(pi,i,si)i∈Θ,rA
(1− ρ)(∑ni=1 qi(pi + γsi))+ ρ(−rA)
subject to IRi, SRi ∀i and ICi,j ∀i, j and
rA ≥ C(i)− pi − si ∀i and
pi, i, si ≥ 0 ∀i and rA ≥ 0
For our described marketplace, one can further consider the corresponding non-adversarial setting, in which the seller solves
the contract design problem in the absence of any adversarial considerations. This non-adversarial contract design problem is
given by:
max
(pi,i,si)i∈Θ
∑n
i=1 qi(pi + γsi)
subject to IRi, SRi ∀i, ICi,j ∀i, j, and, pi, i, si ≥ 0 ∀i
We next study these two contract design problems to characterize the effects of the presence of adversarial types on the
optimal contracts’ properties and the seller’s revenue.
4 Analysis of Adversarial Contracting
In classic contract theory, when solving for the optimal contracts, the functions bi are often assumed to satisfy a condition
known as the single crossing property (SCP), which in turn implies the strict increasing differences (ID) property. Throughout
our analysis, we will only require the (weaker) condition of (non-strict) ID property on the benefit functions bi, as defined
below:
Definition 1 (Increasing Differences). The functions bi satisfy the (strict) increasing differences property if for any ′ > ,
bi(
′)− bi() is (strictly) increasing in the type i.
The above condition is a natural assumption on demand functions, and has been used extensively in the contract theory
literature starting from the seminal work by (Maskin and Riley 1984). The bi functions shown in Figure 1 satisfy ID. This
condition also allows for significant simplification of the classical contract theory optimization problem. Our first, somewhat
surprising result is that, even in the adversarial contract regime with post-hoc fines, the contracts will satisfy a set of constraints
akin to those of non-adversarial settings.
Theorem 1. Assuming that the functions bi satisfy ID, the optimal contracts (in the presence of adversarial types)
(p∗1, 
∗
1, s
∗
1), . . . , (p
∗
n, 
∗
n, s
∗
n) satisfy the following:
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1. Monotonicity: ∗i+1 ≥ ∗i ,∀i.
2. Constraint set reduction: IRi for i > 1 and ICi,j for j 6= i− 1 are redundant at the optimal contracts.
3. IR1 is tight: as a result, p∗1 + γs
∗
1 = b1(
∗
1).
4. ICi+1,i is tight for all i: as a result for i > 1,
p∗i + γs
∗
i = bi(
∗
i )−
i−1∑
j=1
(
bj+1(
∗
j )− bj(∗j )
)
.
Proof Sketch. We first establish the monotonicity of noise levels at the optimal contracts using the (non-strict) ID condition of
the benefit functions. Next, we show how to considerably refine the constraint set (point 2) and derive the price-benefit relations
(points 3-4). These arguments are based on contradiction: had any of these constraints not been redundant/tight, the operator
would have had room to improve her profit by modifying the contracts without violating the remaining IR and IC constraints
of honest buyers. For the contradiction argument to carry through, we show that under appropriate modifications, the effect of
changes in the adversarial types’ behavior on the revenue is non-decreasing.
We note that for the non-adversarial case, the same results of the above theorem holds; this follows from prior work in
contract theory (Maskin and Riley 1984) (using a straightforward mapping that we present in the appendix). Formally:
Proposition 1. Assuming that the functions bi satisfy ID, the optimal contracts in the non-adversarial setting have s∗i = 0 and
satisfy all conditions of Theorem 1 (with s∗i = 0).
In particular, the relation between prices, fines, and benefit functions (points 3-4), provides an easy visual representation of
the contracts as shown in Figure 1 for the non-adversarial setting (that is, with si = 0). We call this curve the price-contract
curve P(), which is a curve on the  (on x-axis), p (on y-axis) plane, and connects the non-adversarial contract points (∗i , p∗i )
for all i. From Proposition 1, we get p∗i − p∗i−1 = bi(∗i )− bi(∗i−1); thus, the segment of the curve P that is between ∗i−1 and
∗i is parallel to bi(·). Thus, P is continuous and piece-wise concave.
Theorem 1’s characterization greatly simplifies the optimization problem to compute the optimal contracts by removing
several of the constraints (points 1-2). The result also shows that the optimization problem for computing optimal contracts in
the presence of adversaries has only additional adversarial constraints and the same price-benefit relations (points 3-4) as that
without adversaries. Despite these similarities, the presence of adversaries changes the seller’s objective function, leading to a
different set of contracts than the non-adversarial setting. Proposition 1 further implies that the variables si can be dropped in
the optimization problem for the non-adversarial case, yet these variable remain a key design choice in the adversarial setting.
Price of Adversary: In order to quantify the effects of the adversary’s presence on the seller’s revenue, we introduce the
following notion:
Definition 2 (Price of Adversary). Let R∗ and R∗A denote the seller’s maximum revenue in non-adversarial and adversarial
settings, respectively. Then, the price of adversary (PoAdv) is defined as:
PoAdv = (1− ρ)R
∗
R∗A
Clearly PoAdv is ≥ 1, with equality when the adversary does not choose any contract, so that R∗A = (1 − ρ)R∗. Our first
finding is that PoAdv is unbounded in the worst case.
Lemma 2. PoAdv is unbounded in the worst case.
Proof Sketch. We prove this by construction with two types of legitimate users H and L. The benefit function are bL() =
log(1 + ) for the lower type L and bH() = 2 log(1 + ) for the higher type H . The function for the adversary is given by
C() = (10/ρ+ 2 1−γργ (exp()− 1). We show that R∗A = 0, leading to an unbounded PoAdv.
5 Approximation Algorithm
In this section, we present an approach that solves for the adversarial contracting problem approximately, given a solution for the
non-adversarial case. We do so since solving the non-adversarial scenario is simpler: by Proposition 1, the non-adversarial case
has both fewer variables (si = 0,∀i) and fewer constraints (no adversary contract choice constraint). Our proposed algorithm
also reveals a subtle relation between the adversarial and non-adversarial settings.
Since by Lemma 2 we know that PoAdv is unbounded in the worst case, we limit our analysis to a large class of adversary’s
benefit functions C(·) which imposes mild and natural restriction on these functions. We call these the well-behaved C’s, and
define them as follows. Recall that P denotes the non-adversarial price-contract curve (see Figure 1).
• (High C) C intersects P once at the origin and then lies above P for  > 0.
• (Low C) C intersects P once at the origin and then lies below P for  > 0.
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Algorithm 1: Approx. Algorithm
Input: Non-adv. contracts (p∗1, ∗1, 0), . . . , (p∗n, ∗n, 0)
Output: An array of contracts or solve adv. case
1 contracts← (p∗1, ∗1, 0), . . . , (p∗n, ∗n, 0)
2 switch C do
3 case High C do
4 M = {k | (p∗i , ∗i , 0) is 0-slack λ-priced for some λ ≥ 0}
5 if M is empty then
6 return solve adv. case
7 j = argmaxk∈M p∗k
8 s∗j ← s that makes (p∗j , ∗j , 0) 0-slack λ-priced
9 for i← 1 to K do
10 contracts(i) = (p∗j − γs∗j , ∗j , s∗j )
11 return contracts
12 case Low C do
13 return contracts
14 case Intermediate C do
15 return InterCApp((p∗1, ∗1, 0), . . . , (p∗n, ∗n, 0))
16 return solve adv. case
• (Intermediate C) C intersects P multiple times. Let M ∈ (0, 1) be the access level at the last intersection point. We denote
∆ := max<M {C()− P()}.
The above classes comprise several types of adversaries. High Cs (low Cs) represent powerful (weak) adversaries, who
can (can not afford to) impose a high cost on the revenue; this class includes functions C() ≥ bn() (C() ≤ b1()) as a
subset. Intermediate Cs on the other hand represent adversaries who can purchase (some of) the contracts offered through non-
adversarial contract design. Within this class, ∆ is an upper bound on the adversary’s payoff from purchasing contracts with
∗i < M . As C lies above P after M , we have C(∗i ) ≥ p∗i for all ∗i ≥ M , which means that the adversary can afford all
contracts with ∗i ≥ M . Figure 1 illustrates an intermediate C. Next, we present our approximation technique. We start with a
definition.
Definition 3. We call the non-adversarial contract (p, l, 0) a δ-slack λ-priced contract, (δ, λ ≥ 0), if there exists s ≥ 0 such
that the contract (p− γs, , s) satisfies:
• C()− p− s ≤ δ, i.e., adversary’s gain is bounded by δ.
• p− γs ≥ λ > 0, i.e., the contract’s price is at least λ.
• p− γs ≥ (1− φ)p, SR constraint is satisfied
Constructively, s whenever it exists, should be chosen to have the least possible value.
Using the above definition, our approximation technique is tailored towards the three categories of functions C as shown
in Algorithm 1. This algorithm takes the set of non-adversarial contracts as input, and either successfully returns a new set of
contracts by modifying this input, or prescribes solving the adversarial contract design problem from scratch. For the High C
case, the algorithm finds 0-slack contracts with a positive price (line 4, 0-slack ensures the adversary will not choose the new
contract). If one is found, the contract generating the highest revenue among such contracts is offered to all users (line 10). For
Low C, the adversary does not choose any contract, hence it is optimal to retain the non-adversarial contracts as is (line 13).
For Intermediate C, the function InterCApp presented in Algorithm 2 is invoked (line 15).
In Algorithm 2, first a set of ∆-slack p∗K-priced contracts is found among contracts above and including that of type K
(line 2). The best contract with index safe(i) among these is found for each user i > K (line 4). New contracts (p∗safe(i) −
γssafe(i), l
∗
safe(i), ssafe(i)) are constructed for types i > K (line 6), and all the non-adversarial contracts for types K and below
are retained as is (line 8). The revenue from honest buyers for the new contracts is found on line 9, and for the non-adversarial
contracts on line 10. β is the utility for the adversarial type in choosing the best new contract (line 11) and α is the same
adversary utility in choosing from the non-adversarial contract set (line 12). Line 13-15 compares the revenue in the adversarial
setting from the non-adversarial contracts and the new contract set, and returns the contract set that leads to better revenue for
the seller.
We next prove that the contracts output by Algorithm 1 are valid. First, we present a lemma on the ordering of honest buyers’
preferences over the contracts, which will later be used for the validity proof.
Lemma 3. Given optimal non-adversarial contracts (p∗1, ∗1, 0), . . . , (p∗n, ∗n, 0), a type i user with i > j prefers contract
(p∗j , 
∗
j , 0) over (p
∗
k, 
∗
k, 0) for j > k.
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Algorithm 2: InterCApp
Input: Non-adv. contracts (p∗1, ∗1, 0), . . . , (p∗n, ∗n, 0)
Output: An array of contracts
1 K ← highest i such that ∗i ≤ M
2 E≥K = {k | k ≥ K and (p∗k, ∗k, 0) is ∆-slack p∗K-priced} . E≥K not empty as K ∈ E≥K
3 for i← K + 1 to n do
4 safe(i)← argmaxk∈E≥K{bi(∗k)− p∗k}
5 s∗safe(i) ← s that makes (p∗safe(i), ∗safe(i), 0) ∆-slack p∗K-priced
6 contracts(i) = (p∗safe(i) − γs∗safe(i), ∗safe(i), s∗safe(i))
7 for i← 1 to K do
8 contracts(i) = (p∗i , 
∗
i , 0)
9 R̂∗K =
∑K
i=1 qip
∗
i +
∑n
i=K+1 qip
∗
safe(i)
10 R∗ =
∑n
i=1 qip
∗
i
11 β = max
(
maxi≤K{C(∗i )− p∗i },maxi>K{C(∗safe(i))− p∗safe(i) − s∗safe(i)}
)
12 α = maxi{C(∗i )− p∗i }
13 if (1− ρ)R∗ − ρα > (1− ρ)R̂∗K − ρβ then
14 return (p∗1, ∗1, 0), . . . , (p∗n, ∗n, 0)
15 return contracts
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The validity of the Algorithm 1’s output is as follows:
Lemma 4. For Low or Intermediate Cs, Algorithm 1’s output contracts satisfy the IR and IC conditions for all honest buyers.
If Algorithm 1 outputs a set of contracts for a High C adversary, then at least one honest buyer buys the contract.
Proof. For High C, there is one contract offered to all users, so the IC constraints are trivially satisfied. Also, for user j the
contract offered satisfies IR, since from optimality of the non-adversarial contracts we get bj(∗j )−p∗j ≥ 0. For LowC, the proof
is immediate from optimality of the non-adversarial contracts.For Intermediate C, if the non-adversarial contracts are returned
by Algorithm 2. then the claim again holds trivially. Otherwise, if new contracts are returned, first, observe that the contract
(p∗K , 
∗
K , 0) is ∆-slack p
∗
K-priced (follows from Def. 3 and definition of K, ∆). Thus, E≥K is not empty as K ∈ E≥K . Also,
note that for users i > K, the offered modified contracts (line 6) still has the effective price p∗safe(i)−γs∗safe(i)+γs∗safe(i) = p∗safe(i)
which is the same as the non-adversarial contract.
We first start by analyzing users i > K. All users j > K are offered modified contracts (line 6) among those indexed by
E≥K (loop on line 3). By definition of safe(i), bi(∗safe(i))−p∗safe(i) ≥ bi(∗k)−p∗k for all k ∈ E≥K . Thus, i prefers his contract
over any other offered to any j > K. Next, by definition of safe(i), bi(∗safe(i))− p∗safe(i) ≥ bi(∗K)− p∗K , and then by Lemma 3
and i > K, bi(∗K)−p∗K ≥ bi(∗j )−p∗j for all j ≤ K. Thus, bi(∗safe(i))−p∗safe(i) ≥ bi(∗j )−p∗j for all j ≤ K. For IR, first by ID
we have bi(∗K) ≥ bK(∗K), hence bi(∗K)− p∗K ≥ bK(∗K)− p∗K ≥ 0, where the≥ 0 is due to optimality of the non-adversarial
contracts. Finally, we just proved that bi(∗safe(i))− p∗safe(i) ≥ bi(∗K)− p∗K , thus, bi(∗safe(i))− p∗safe(i) ≥ 0.
The users i ≤ K are offered the non-adversarial contracts, thus, bi(∗i )− p∗i ≥ bi(∗j )− p∗j for all j 6= i. Since the modified
contracts (line 6) still have an effective price same as the non-adversarial contract, any user i ≤ K still prefers his contract to
the modified ones. The IR constraint is satisfied as the non-adversarial contracts were optimal.
Next, the following result establishes the quality of the contracts returned by Algorithm 1 by bounding the PoAdv. Recall
that we have already shown in Lemma 2 that PoAdv is unbounded in the worst case.
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Theorem 2. Let the optimal non-adversarial contract (p∗1, ∗i ), . . . , (p∗n, ∗n) revenue be R∗. For the class of well-behaved C’s,
we have,
• (High C) PoAdv is unbounded in general. If Algorithm 1 outputs a contract, then PoAdv ≤ R∗λmini{qi} .
• (Low C) Algorithm 1 always outputs the same contracts as the non-adversarial case, and hence PoAdv = 1.
• (Intermediate C) Alg. 1 always outputs contracts. Then,
PoAdv ≤ R
∗
max
(
R̂∗K −∆ ρ1−ρ , R∗ − α ρ1−ρ
) .
Proof Sketch. The analysis for High and Low C is straightforward. For intermediate C, depending on whether new contracts
or the original contracts is offered, the revenue is max of the revenues in these two scenarios. Then the result follows by noting
that β ≤ ∆.
6 Numerical Example
While our theory results provide a broad characterization of the problem for a large space of utility functions, in this section we
illustrate specific points related to the problem parameters, with a numerical example. We use n = 10 types of honest buyers
(except when varying n), with bi() = i(1− exp(− 10i )), C() = 6(exp()− 1), and φ = 0.95.
Runtime comparison: Fig. 2 illustrates runtimes when computing the optimal adversarial contracts and optimal non-
adversarial contracts. The optimal adversarial contracts take much more time to compute than the non-adversarial contracts
and the difference increases exponentially with increase in the size of problem n. This shows why approximation is useful; our
approximation approach takes almost the same time as the non-adversarial problem, as the approximation steps after solving
the non-adversarial problem have (comparatively) negligible runtime.
Price of adversary with non-adversarial contracts: Fig. 3 shows the price of adversary for varying γ and ρ when the non-
adversarial contracts are offered in an adversarial setting. We observe that the PoAdv rises exponentially with ρ. Intuitively,
the non-adversarial contracts suffer great losses if adversarial buyers dominate the market.
Price of adversary with optimal adversarial contracts: Fig. 4 shows the price of adversary for varying γ and ρ when
the optimal adversarial contracts are computed exactly. The PoAdv rises with both increasing γ and ρ. Intuitively, higher ρ
represents adversaries’ market domination, and higher γ is weaker honest users (i.e., more attack-prone). Thus, higher values
for both of these parameters cause more loss, leading to higher PoAdv.
Performance of approximation: Lastly, Fig. 5 shows the price of adversary computed using our approximation approach
for varying γ and ρ. The C that we chose corresponds to an Intermediate C. The PoAdv varies mostly with γ and is almost
constant throughout at 2.77, except for very small values of γ when it is 1.43. For small values of γ, the approximation algorithm
sends back the original contracts as is (line 14 in Algorithm 2).
7 Related Work
Our work is within the emerging literature of data commercialization and its challenges (Thomas and Leiponen 2016). (Ghosh
and Roth 2015; Gkatzelis, Aperjis, and Huberman 2015; Li et al. 2014) study the problem of pricing personal data, where a
data seller designs a pricing mechanism which incentivizes data subjects to reveal their private information. (Niyato et al. 2016)
design a pricing scheme for selling data to users with differing willingness to pay. Our approach differs in that we propose a
contract-theoretical framework to accommodate heterogeneous honest buyers as well as adversarial types. More specifically, in
contrast to existing work, we posit that honest buyers do not attempt to compromise the privacy of the database, hence every
sale of data is not a loss of privacy. Further, by far the practice in real world is for the data seller to obtain data by compensating
people in form of a one-shot monetary payment or free service (Porter 2018), which is part of our model. This avoids unrealistic
mechanisms in which data subjects are paid every time their data is sold to a buyer (Li et al. 2014).
(Adam and Worthmann 1989) classified privacy-preserving query approaches into query restriction, data perturbation, and
output perturbation. Query auditing (a form of query restriction) aims to determine whether, given the query history, a new query
will compromise the database privacy; however, this problem is NP-hard (Kleinberg, Papadimitriou, and Raghavan 2003). In
addition, output perturbation mechanisms (including differential privacy) must limit the number of queries in order to maintain
any reasonable privacy guarantee (Dinur and Nissim 2003). Our proposed approach, which is a combination of query restriction
with output perturbation, restricts the type and number of queries in light of these impossibility results.
Contract-theoretical frameworks have been receiving attention as a method for optimal pricing in other application areas,
including the design of demand-response programs (Meir, Ma, and Robu 2017), energy procurement methods (Tavafoghi and
Teneketzis 2014), and incentive mechanisms in crowdsourcing markets (Ho, Slivkins, and Vaughan 2016). In contrast, we
consider the optimal pricing problem in the presence of both honest and adversarial users.
Another line of work studies the effects of malicious or spiteful agents in game-theoretical settings, including network
inoculation games (Moscibroda, Schmid, and Wattenhofer 2006), sealed-bid auctions and colluding bidders (Brandt, Sandholm,
and Shoham 2007; Micali and Valiant 2008), and resource allocation games (Chorppath and Alpcan 2011). These works assume
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that malicious agents aim to minimize the utility of all other users, and analyzes their effect on the Nash equilibria, in a game-
theoretic framework. In contrast, we consider the effects of an adversarial user on the principal’s revenue in a contract-theoretic
framework.
8 Conclusion
We proposed a novel and practical adversarial contract design framework in which a data seller designs a collection of contracts
to optimize her revenue in the presence of honest and adversarial users. We quantified the effect of adversaries by proposing
the notion of price of adversary, and characterized the effect of fines on optimal revenue. We also presented a fast approximate
technique to compute contracts in an adversarial setting.
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Appendix
Theorem 1
Proof of Theorem 1. As a shorthand, we will write p′i = pi + γsi throughout.
Monotonicity: First, we claim that for every optimal fixed cost contract we must have i ≥ j whenever i > j. Let i > j.
The IC constraints include
bi(i)− p′i ≥ bi(j)− p′j
bj(j)− p′j ≥ bj(i)− p′i
Adding these, we get
bi(i)− bi(j) ≥ bj(i)− bj(j)
There are two cases (1) bi(i) − bi(j) > bj(i) − bj(j) or (2) bi(i) − bi(j) = bj(i) − bj(j). For case (1), we can claim
that i ≥ j using non-strict ID of the benefits functions. The proof is by contradiction. Assume i < j ; then, by non-strict ID
we must have bi(i) − bi(j) ≤ bj(i) − bj(j) which violates case (1). Hence under case (1) i ≥ j . As the reasoning here
is not based on the seller’s objective value or the adversarial type’s constraints, we do not need to consider adversarial aspects
here.
Next, under case (2), letK = bi(i)−bi(j) = bj(i)−bj(j). First, ifK is≥ 0 then i ≥ j when bi and bj are both strictly
monotone increasing. As the reasoning here is not based on the objective value or the adversarial constraints, we do not need to
consider adversarial aspects here. The case when bi and bj are both monotone non-decreasing has to be dealt in a special way
(see after the K < 0 case below).
Thus, the only scenario left to analyze is K < 0. Then the two IC inequalities stated at the start can be re-written as
K ≥ p′i−p′j and−K ≥ −(p′i−p′j) which implies p′i−p′j = K, or p′i < p′j . Also, bi(i)−p′i = bi(j)+K−p′j−K = bi(j)−p′j ,
so that contract i and j are both equally and most preferred by i (and similarly by j). Then offer another set of contracts in
which i is offered (pj , j , sj), and others are offered their earlier contract. In this new contract, all of the IC constraints are still
satisfied as type i preferred (pj , j , sj) the most and equally preferred the now unavailable (pi, i, si). For any other type they
prefer their allocation and price to (pj , j , sj) as was the case for the earlier set of contracts. Also, since bi(i)−p′i = bi(j)−p′j
and earlier contract’s IR provided bj(i)− p′i ≥ 0, we have the new contract’s IR is also satisfied bi(j)− p′j ≥ 0. The SRi is
also trivially satisfied since SRj was satisfied. In this new set of contracts, as p′j > p
′
i the revenue from i increases and all other
honest users provide same revenue as earlier, thus, the operator’s revenue from the honest users strictly increases. Finally, we
need to analyze the adversaries incentives in this new collection of contracts. For the adversary, the new set of contracts provides
fewer options to choose from; thus, for any choice made by the adversary in the new contract regime, he obtains less or equal
utility to that from the original contract set. As the operator’s utility is zero-sum with the adversary’s utility, the contribution
from the adversarial part of the operator’s revenue either increases or stays the same in the new set of contracts. Thus, putting
these together, we have found a new, feasible set of contracts, that strictly outperforms the original set of contracts, contradicting
the optimality of the original set. Hence, we cannot have K < 0.
Special case (non-decreasing bi and bj): The case when bi and bj are both monotone non-decreasing requires to treat the
special case of K = 0 separately. Thus, reasoning exactly like the K < 0 case we get that p′i = p
′
j and bi(i) = bi(j) and
(pi, i, si) and (pj , j , sj) are both equally preferred by i. Now, if i ≥ j we are done, but if not we can offer (pj , j , sj) to i.
Following an argument similar to the case of K < 0, the new set of contracts would satisfy all IR, SR, and IC constraints of
the honest types. From the seller’s viewpoint, the overall revenue from legitimate users remains the same as the original set of
contracts. Further, following an argument similar to case K < 0, the contribution from the adversarial part of the revenue either
increases or stays the same with the new set of contracts. Therefore, for this special case, we can claim that if i < j , the set of
contracts is revenue equivalent (or even suboptimal to) a collection of contracts with i = j . We conclude that at the optimal
contract, i ≥ j for this case as well.
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Constraint-set reduction: Next, we move on to the IC and IR constraints’ properties. We start with the IR constraints.
Starting from IRi, we have,
bi(i)− p′i ≥ bi(i−1)− p′i−1
≥ bi−1(i−1)− p′i−1 ,
where the first line follows from ICi,i−1, and the second line by the assumption on ordering of the benefit functions, i.e.,
bi(l) ≥ bj(l),∀i > j,∀l. Thus, if IRi−1 is satisfied so is IRi. Hence, given IR1 is satisfied, all other IR constraints are
redundant. As the reasoning here is not based on objective value or adversary constraints, this assertion holds both with and
without adversarial types.
Next, we consider the (IC) constraints. By ICi−1,i−2 we have bi−1(i−1) − p′i−1 ≥ bi−1(i−2) − p′i−2, which can be
rearranged as bi−1(i−1)−bi−1(i−2) ≥ p′i−1−p′i−2. By non-strict increasing difference and, as shown earlier, the monotonicity
of access levels, i−1 ≥ i−2, we get,
bi(i−1)− bi(i−2) ≥ bi−1(i−1)− bi−1(i−2) ≥ p′i−1 − p′i−2.
Thus, bi(i−1) − p′i−1 ≥ bi(i−2) − p′i−2. By ICi,i−1, we have bi(i) − p′i ≥ bi(i−1) − p′1−i, and hence we can infer that
bi(i) − p′i ≥ bi(i−2) − p′i−2. Thus, given the local downward IC constraints ICi−1,i−2 and ICi,i−1, the ICi,i−2 constraint
is redundant; similarly, all ICi,i−k constraints are redundant for k ≥ 2. Next, for the local upward IC constraints, starting from
ICi+1,i+2, we have bi+1(i+1)−p′i+1 ≥ bi+1(li+2)−p′i+2, which can be rearranged as p′i+2−p′i+1 ≥ bi+1(li+2)−bi+1(i+1).
Again, by non-strict increasing difference and monotonicity i+1 ≥ li, we’ll get bi(i+1)− p′i+1 ≥ bi(li+2)− p′i+2. Thus, we
conclude that given the local upward IC constraints, all other upward constraints ICi,i+k for k ≥ 2 are redundant. Hence, only
the local ICi,i+1 and ICi,i−1 constraints are non-redundant. As the reasoning here is not based on objective value or adversary
constraints, the arguments remain valid in the presence of adversaries.
Next, we show that the local upward IC constraints ICi,i+1 is also redundant. For contradiction, suppose we solve the
optimization problem without the ICi,i+1 constraint, and get the set of contracts {pj , j , sj} that maximize the operator’s
revenue. This solution should strictly violate ICi,i+1 (since we are assuming ICi,i+i is not redundant). Therefore, type i will
strictly prefer the contract {pi+1, i+1, si+1}, that is, bi(i+1)− bi(i) > p′i+1−p′i. We now modify the contracts by increasing
pj ,∀j ≥ i + 1 by a small amount  > 0, i.e., we offer the contract {pi+1 + , i+1, si+1} to type i + 1, as well as contracts
{pj + , j , sj} for all j > i+ 1. We chose  small enough so that ICi,i+1 remains strictly violated.
We know from the violation of ICi,i+1 that bi(i+1) − bi(i) > p′i+1 − p′i, and also, by non-strict increasing differences,
that bi+1(i+1) − bi+1(i) > p′i+1 − p′i, or rearranging bi+1(i+1) − p′i+1 > bi+1(i) − p′i; thus, ICi+1,i is satisfied with{pi+1 + , i, si}. For all other local upward IC constraints of types i + 1 and higher (i.e, ICi+1,i+2, ICi+2,i+1, ICi+2,i+3
and so on), the prices on both sides of the constraint change by an equal amount in the modified contract set. Therefore, these
constraints continue to hold. For all other IC constraints there is no change in variable values and they continue to hold. The IR1
constraint is also unaffected as the contract does not change for type 1. All SR constraints still hold as only prices increased.
For the adversary, the contracts in the new collection are either the same (if he was purchasing one of the unaltered contracts)
or become less attractive (if he was purchasing the altered contract). Thus, for any choice made by the adversary in the new
contract regime, he obtains either less or the same utility as the original contract set. As the seller’s and adversary’s utilities are
zero-sum, the contribution from the adversarial part of the revenue either increases or stays the same following the change in
the contracts. Thus, this new set of contracts provides higher revenue to the operator, contradicting the optimality of the original
set of contracts. We conclude that all local upward IC constraints should be redundant.
IR1 is redundant, i.e., no information rent for the lowest type: we prove this by contradiction. Suppose IR1 is not
binding; then, the operator can increase p1 slightly without violating IR1 (and trivially not violating SR1). The only other
constraint in which in which p1 appears is the LHS of the downward IC constraint IC21. An increase in p1 will lower the LHS,
and hence this constraint will not be violated either. Therefore, the operator’s portion of the revenue from legitimate users is
strictly increasing with this increase in p1. From the adversary’s viewpoint, the new set of contracts (with an increased p1 in
the lowest type’s contract) will either stay the same or becomes less attractive. Thus, for any choice made by the adversary in
the new contract regime, he obtains less or equal utility to his utility in the original contract set. As the seller’s revenue portion
from the adversarial type’s participation is the negative of the adversary’s utility, the contribution from the adversarial part of
the revenue will either increase or stay the same given the increase in p1. Thus, the modification of the price p1 will lead to a
feasible set of contracts that strictly increases the operator’s revenue, contradicting the optimality of the original contract set.
We thus conclude that IR1 should be binding in the optimal contract set, so that p∗1 + γs
∗
1 = b1(
∗
1).
(ICi,i−1) is binding, i.e., information rent for higher types: finally, we show that all the ICi,i−1,∀i ≥ 2 constraints are
binding. For contradiction, suppose ICi,i−1 is not binding. Then we can increase pi by  without violating this constraint. In
all remaining local downward IC constraint, pi only appears on the LHS of ICi+1,i; the increase in pi will therefore not violate
this constraint. In addition, IR1 will not be affected and also SRi constraint will not be violated as pi only appears on the LHS
of SRi, and the revenue of the operator from legitimate users will strictly increase following this change. For the adversary,
for all contracts in the new set of contract, the contract either stays the same or becomes less attractive for the adversary (due
to higher price). Thus, for any choice made by the adversary in the new contract regime, he obtains less or equal utility to that
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from the original contract set. As the seller receives the negative of the adversary’s utility, the contribution from the adversarial
part of the objective either increases or stays the same, and hence the overall revenue of the operator increases with the modified
contract set. This provides a contradiction to the optimality of the initial contracts. Therefore, the local downward IC constraints
should be binding, leading to,
p∗i+1 + γs
∗
i+1 = bi+1(l
∗
i+1)−
i∑
j=1
(
bj+1(
∗
j )− bj(∗j )
)
.
In contract theory literature, the term
∑i
j=1
(
bj+1(
∗
j ) − bj(∗j )
)
is known as the information rent of type i; it is the discount
this type gets over the first-best prices that could be attained with full information about the users’ types.
Proposition 1
Proof of Proposition 1. First, we will prove that for any optimal solution with non-zero si’s there is a revenue (objective)
equivalent solution with all si zero. The transformation is simple: given any solution (pi, i, si), the contract (pi + γs, i, 0) is
feasible and revenue optimal. The revenue stays the same, which trivially follows from the objective function. All constraints,
except SR, have the term pi + γs, and hence they are satisfied. The SR constraints are trivially satisfied as si is zero in the new
contract.
Next, with contracts for which si is 0, the optimization reduces to
max
(pi,i)i∈Θ
∑n
i=1 qipi
subject to IRi ∀i and ICi,j ∀i, j and pi, i ≥ 0 ∀i
This is exactly same as the classic contract theory problem, and the conditions of Theorem 1 (with s∗i = 0) follows from the
seminal work by (Maskin and Riley 1984)
Lemma 2
Proof of Lemma 2. Consider a problem with two types of users H and L. Let the benefit function be log(1 + ) for the lower
type L and 2 log(1 + ) for the higher type H . Given the user is not an adversary, the user is a lower type with probability q and
higher type with probability 1 − q. The function C for adversary is K(exp() − 1), where K will be chosen below. For now,
let K ≥ 2 + 2(1− γ)/γ.
For the adversarial revenue maximization case we will show the revenue is 0. Let the contract with the adversary with
(pL, L, sL) and (pH , H , sH). To show 0 revenue we will show that H = 0 (and since L ≤ H , L = 0). We do so
by contradiction, whereby assume H > 0. First, it directly follows from Theorem 1 that pL + γsL = log(1 + L) and
pH + γsH ≤ 2 log(1 + H). Next, as H ≥ L, we have pL + γsL ≤ log(1 + H).
The adversary never rejects the higher contract, since for any H ∈ (0, 1].
K(exp(H)− 1) ≥ (2 + 2(1− γ)/γ)(exp(H)− 1)
≥ (2 + 2(1− γ)/γ) log(1 + H)
≥ 21− γ
γ
log(1 + H) + 2 log(1 + H)
≥ 21− γ
γ
log(1 + H) + pH + γsH
Now, as 2 log(1 + H) ≥ γsH (since 2 log(1 + H) ≥ pH + γsH and pH ≥ 0), then the adversary does not reject the higher
contract as
2
1− γ
γ
log(1 + H) + pH + γsH ≥ pH + sH
The above also provides the inequality
(2 + 2(1− γ)/γ) log(1 + H) ≥ pH + sH (2)
Then, the adversary either chooses the lower or higher contract. Then, the seller’s utility is (1 − ρ)(q ∗ (pL + γsL) + (1 −
q) ∗ (pH + γsH)) + ρ[pZ + sZ − K(exp(Z) − 1)], where Z is either L or H . If Z = H , then the revenue is (1 − ρ)(q ∗
(pL + γsL) + (1− q) ∗ (pH + γsH)) + ρ[pH + sH −K(exp(H)− 1)]. Then, observe that if Z = L, it means the adversary
found L more attractive, that is, −[pL + sL −K(exp(L) − 1)] ≥ −[pH + sH −K(exp(H) − 1)]. Thus, it can be said that
(1− ρ)(q ∗ (pL + γsL) + (1− q) ∗ (pH + γsH)) + ρ[pH + sH −K(exp(H)− 1)] is an upper bound on the revenue.
Next, (1− ρ)(q ∗ (pL + γsL) + (1− q) ∗ (pH + γsH)) + ρ(pH + sH) must be less than pL + γsL + pH + sH , which by
previous inequality number 2 and pL + γsL ≤ log(1 + H) is
≤ log(1 + H) + (2 + 2(1− γ)/γ) log(1 + H)
= 3 log(1 + H) + 2
1− γ
γ
log(1 + H)
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Now, choose
K = 10/ρ+ 2
1− γ
ργ
,
which is clearly ≥ 2 + 2(1− γ)/γ also. Then,
ρK[exp(H)− 1] = (10 + 2(1− γ)/γ) ∗ (exp(H)− 1)
≥ 10 log(1 + H) + 21− γ
γ
log(1 + H)
Hence, the upper bound on revenue (1− ρ)(q ∗ (pL + γsL) + (1− q) ∗ (pH + γsH)) + ρ[pH + sH ]− ρK(exp(H)− 1)] is less
than −7 log(1 + H) which is strictly negative for positive H , and thus, the revenue is negative. This contradicts the optimality
of H as 0 revenue is obtained with pH , H , sH = 0. We conclude that H = L = 0, so that R∗A = 0.
On the other hand, without adversarial types, the operator can attain positive revenue. This is because the seller’s problem
(using Theorem 1) will be to maximize
qbL(L) + (1− q)[bH(H)− bH(L) + bL(L)]
= bL(L)− (1− q)bH(L) + (1− q)bH(H)
Hence, it is optimal to choose H = 1, leading to a lower bound of R∗ ≥ (1− q)2 log 2 on the non-adversarial revenue.
Lemma 3
Proof of Lemma 3. From Theorem 1, we know that bj(j) − pj = bj(j−1) − pj−1, or equivalently, bj(j) − bj(j−1) =
pj − pj−1. Using the ID property of the benefit functions, for i > j we get bi(j)− bi(j−1) ≥ bj(j)− bj(j−1) = pj − pj−1,
hence bi(j)− pj ≥ bi(j−1)− pj−1. Thus, i prefers contract j to j − 1. Arguing inductively, we have the required result.
Theorem 2
Proof of Theorem 2. For High C, if a contract is offered, the adversary will not choose this contract due to 0-slack, but at least
user i will choose it. Thus, the revenue is at least (1 − ρ)λmini qi. For low C, clearly the adversary does not choose any
contract, and R∗A = (1− ρ)R∗.
For intermediate C, the revenue from the contracts output by Algorithm 1 is R̂∗K . The adversary may choose any of the
contracts. If the choice isZ ≤ K (all of which have fine 0), then by definition of intermediate functions andK,C(∗Z)−p∗Z ≤ ∆
for all such Z. If Z > K, then since the offered contracts > K are all ∆-slack, we again have C(∗Z) − p∗Z − s∗Z ≤ ∆. Thus,
β ≤ ∆, and the revenue is lower bounded by (1− ρ)R̂∗K − ρ∆. Finally, by not changing the original non-adversarial contracts
the operator obtains a revenue (1 − ρ)R∗ − ρα. Thus, the revenue in the presence of adversaries is bounded by the maximum
of either of these two lower bounds.
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